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ABSTRACT. We provide an alternative theoretical explanation for a number
of empirical regularities relating to the dynamics of industry structrure (prod-
uct life cycle) and changes in size and age distribution of ﬁrms over time. We
explain why entry may continue over a considerable period of time, why shake
out of ﬁrms occur in mature industries and why exiting ﬁrms are likely to be
younger and smaller in size than incumbents. Unlike the existing theoretical lit-
erature, this explanation is not based on uncertainty, structural non-stationarity
or incomplete information. We consider an inﬁnite horizon, complete informa-
tion, deterministic competitive industry with continuum of ﬁrms and stationary
market demand. Firms have perfect foresight, may enter or exit the industry
at any point of time and active ﬁrms undertake investment which reduces their
future cost of production. Investment by active ﬁrms also leads to the growth of
an industry-wide capital that reduces production cost of all ﬁrms (externality).
The marginal cost curves are upward sloping and ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed cost of
staying in the industry. While all entering ﬁrms earn zero intertemporal net
proﬁt, their instantaneous net proﬁt is typically negative when they are young
and strictly positive when they mature. Positive proﬁts may persist in the long
run. Equilibrium prices decline over time while the level of positive industry-
wide externality increases with time.The equilibrium path makes ﬁrms indif-
ferent between alternative entry and exit decisions and their investment levels
after entry reﬂects their length of stay and the nature of industry environment
(prices, externalities) over their period of stay in the industry. Heterogeneity
emerges out of deliberate choice.1 Introduction.
Economists have long recognized that the dynamics of industry structure as
well as ﬁrm size & performance are closely related to changes in technology and
productivity. The latter, in turn, are related to activities such as investment in
learning-by-doing, cost reducing innovations and other forms of capital (includ-
ing knowledge capital) that take place at the level of individual ﬁrms. While
some of these activities clearly result in assets that are ﬁrm-speciﬁc( f o re x a m -
ple, organizational capital), others lead to creation of assets (such as knowledge)
that spillover to other ﬁr m si nt h ei n d u s t r y .T h es t o c k so ft h e s ev a r i o u sf o r m s
of capital and the intensity of productivity enhancing investments change over
time, causing changes in the size or production "scale" of ﬁrms and thereby af-
fecting prices & proﬁtability in the industry. The latter, in turn, determine the
incentives for entry and exit of ﬁrms and thus, the industry structure. In other
words, the dynamics of industry structure, size & performance of ﬁrms and pro-
ductivity changes in the industry are interlinked. In this paper, we analyze the
dynamics of a competitive industry where ﬁrms may enter or exit the industry
over time, carry out investment in capital that reduces ﬁrm speciﬁc production
cost and, at the same times, generates positive industry-wide externalities.
It is now generally understood that industries experience very high turnover
of ﬁrms and exhibit high degree of variance in size and growth rates across ﬁrms.1
Over the last few decades, empirical studies of technologically progressive man-
ufacturing industries have established certain broad regularities pertaining to
the manner in which industries evolve from birth through maturity that have
collectively come to be known as the product life cycle2. These regularities
relate, among other things, to the pattern of entry, exit and growth of ﬁrms
within industries as well as changes in the size & age distribution of ﬁrms. In
the early phase of an industry, there is a lot of entry. In some industries, the
number of entrants may rise over time or it may peak at the start of the industry
and then decline over time. In either case, the number of entrants eventually
becomes small and shake-out of ﬁrms begins as the industry matures. The num-
ber of active of ﬁrms grows initially, then reaches a peak, after which it declines
steadily despite continued growth in industry output. Eventually, the industry
stabilizes.3The other set of empirical regularity has to do with age and size dis-
tribution of ﬁrms. Firms that enter earlier are more likely to grow faster, tend
to be larger in size and have a greater chance of survival. On the average, ﬁrms
that exit the industry are smaller and younger than the incumbents.
Since the early eighties, a wide range of theoretical models of stochastic
evolution and selection in competitive industries have been developed in order
1For example, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) study a sample of US manufacturing
industries over a period of 5 years and report rates of entry ranging from 30.7% to 42.7% and
an equally dramatic exit rate ranging from 30.8% to 39% across industries. See also, Davis
and Haltiwanger (1992).
2Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and Grady (1990) examine the annual time path
in the number of producers for 46 new products beginning with their commercial inception.
See, also later studies by Utterback and Suarez (1993) and Klepper and Simons (1993).
3For a nice summary, see Klepper (1996).
1to explain the empirical regularities relating to industry dynamics. Thus, Jo-
vanovic (1982) analyzes the dynamics of a competitive industry where ﬁrms are
uncertain about their productivity and acquire noisy signals about their eﬃ-
ciency as they operate in the industry; incumbent ﬁrms aﬄicted by unfavorable
signals conclude they are ineﬃcient and exit the market to be replaced by new
entrants - the eﬃcient grow and survive, while the ineﬃcient decline and fail
(see also, Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). Pakes and Ericson (1998) discuss the
implications of a more general version of this model and compare this with those
of a stochastic model of their own, where ﬁrms actively undertake investment
in order to inﬂuence the conditional distribution of future technology shocks af-
fecting them.4 Klepper and Graddy (1990) discuss an evolutionary model where
the number of potential entrants is limited, potential entrants diﬀer in their ini-
tial cost and product qualities, receive new information over time which changes
their cost and product quality in a stochastic fashion and no further updating
of cost and quality occurs after entry.5 Jovanovic and Lach (1989) consider a
model with learning by doing and stochastic diﬀusion of innovation where po-
tential entrants can gain by learning from incumbent ﬁrms but all learning stops
after entry; the model generates delayed entry and staggered exit.
In a fairly general model with exogenous ﬁrm level technology shocks and
allowing for a wide class of ﬁrm-level actions (including investment in ﬁrm-
speciﬁc cost reduction), Hopenhayn (1992a,b) shows the possibility of entry
and exit as part of the limit behavior of a dynamic stochastic industry. In a
similar model, Hopenhayn (1993) related the observed pattern of entry and exit
over product life cycle to stochastic demand expansion and technology shocks.
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) analyze a dynamic competitive industry where
innovational opportunities fuel entry and failure to innovate, whose chances are
exogenously speciﬁed, leads to exit.
The unifying feature of almost the entire existing literature is its reliance on
some form of ﬁrm-level uncertainty (including uncertainty arising incomplete
information & noisy signals) in creating and amplifying heterogeneity among
ﬁrms. These shocks may aﬀect either potential entrants or incumbents, or both.
The process of market selection leads to exit of incumbent ﬁrms aﬄicted by un-
favorable shocks (or signals) while entry occurs because of favorable updating of
future proﬁtability by potential entrants or simply because the prior belief about
future proﬁtability is signiﬁcantly better than that of the ﬁrms that exit.6To put
4E r i c s o na n dP a k e s( 1 9 9 5 )a n a l y z eag e n e r a lm o d e lw i t hs t o c h a s t i ce n t r ya n dg r o w t ho f
ﬁrms that invest in order to improve future proﬁtability & are aﬀected by idiosyncratic shocks;
they establish the ergodicity of a rational expectations Markov-perfect equilibrium process for
the industry.
5Klepper (1996) discusses a stochastic evolutionary model where ﬁrms diﬀer randomly in
innovative capabilities (relating to product innovation) and the value of innovation is pro-
portional to output. The model allows for imitation as well as process innovation that only
reduces current cost. The paper generates several observed features of the product life cycle
- particularly, the sequencing of product and process innovations.
6In a somewhat related exercise, Lambson (1991) analyzes a dynamic competitive model
where ﬁrms make investment that entails sunk cost and whose proﬁtability is aﬀected by
exogenous shocks over time; the equilibrium path exhibits hysterisis and high turnover of
plants (see also Dixit, 1989).
2it more bluntly, if all uncertainty is taken out of these models, then the industry
equilibrium paths hardly generate any kind of interesting dynamics and quite
often, reduce to the outcome of a static model.
This, then leads to the following question: is it the case that the patterns of
changes in industry structure as observed say, over the product life cycle, arise
only through through uncertainty and that there are no other fundamental
forces aﬀecting industry dynamics? This paper is an attempt to provide an
alternative explanation which is not based on any form of uncertainty, non-
stationary demand structure or incomplete information.
We consider a classical, inﬁnite horizon, deterministic, complete information
model of a competitive industry with a continuum of ﬁrms. All ﬁrms are ex ante
identical, perfectly rational, forward looking and have perfect foresight. There
are no strategic factors aﬀecting entry or causing exit. Further, unlike some of
the existing literature, there is no dearth of potential entrants at any point of
time. We pose the following questions: Can the dynamic path of an industry be
consistent with the empirical regularities mentioned earlie?. Would some ﬁrms
enter later than others? Would some ﬁrms exit earlier than others? Would
later entrants tend to exit earlier? Would exiting ﬁrms be small relative to
incumbents that stay on? Would ﬁrms become heterogenous over time through
deliberate choice even though they are initially identical? Can proﬁts persist
in the long run? This paper is an answer to all of these questions. And its an
aﬃrmative answer.
We build on earlier work by Petrakis, Rasmusen and Roy (1997) and Pe-
trakis and Roy (1999) that analyze similar deterministic models of dynamic
competitive industry. In these papers, ﬁrms that enter the industry invest in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc cost reduction through accumulation of capital or experience. The
industry equilibrium path is socially optimal and generates shake-out of ﬁrms.
However, these papers are unable to explain some of the interesting empirical
regularities such as the fact that entry continues over a considerable period of
time i.e., some ﬁrms enter later than others, later entrants tend to be smaller
and have a lower survival rate (i.e., exit earlier) so that exiting ﬁrms are typ-
ically smaller and younger and so on. One reason behind this is the fact that
these models rule out spillover from investment by existing ﬁrms. Also, the
models assume ﬁnite time horizon which rules out analysis of long run behavior
of industries.
We consider a model which is similar to Petrakis and Roy (1999) - ﬁrms
invest in cost reduction. However, in our model, the cost of production is also
aﬀected by the stock of an industry-wide capital that grows over time according
to the total investment eﬀort by all ﬁrms in the industry.7 The introduction of
this externality complicates the analysis considerably - particularly, because the
properties of the equilibrium path can no longer be related to a social planner’s
optimization problem.
7Stokey (1986) analyzes a model of dynamic oligopoly with industry-wide externality where
the unit cost of production depends on cumulative past output of the industry. There is no
investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc cost reduction nor is there any possibility of entry or exit in her
model.
3In equilibrium, all entering ﬁrms earn zero intertemporal net proﬁt. How-
ever, their instantaneous proﬁt, net of investment cost, is typically negative
when they are young and strictly positive when they mature. Equilibrium prices
decline over time, while the level of positive industry-wide externality increases
with time - the former discourages delayed entry while the latter encourages it.
The equilibrium path makes ﬁrms indiﬀerent between alternative entry and exit
decisions. Their investment levels after entry reﬂects their duration of stay and
the nature of industry environment (prices, externalities) over their period of
stay. Heterogeneity emerges out of deliberate choice. We show the possibility of
d e l a y e de n t r ya n ds h a k e - o u to fﬁrms on the equilibrium path and relate them
to the technology and demand conditions. Entry may occur even while incum-
bents earn negative proﬁts. Exit may occur even while incumbents grow in size
and earn positive proﬁts. Exiting ﬁrms are smaller and younger than incum-
bents. Under certain conditions, entry and exit decline to zero in the limit and
the industry stabilizes. Firms that are active in the long run may earn strictly
positive proﬁt in the limit (explains persistence of proﬁts in the long run).
2M o d e l
We consider a discrete time inﬁnite horizon model of a dynamic competitive
industry with a continuum of price taking ﬁrms that are free to enter and exit
the industry in any period. All ﬁrms are ex ante identical. In any time period,
the cost function of a ﬁrm depends on its own stock of ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l e d g e
and the industry’s stock of knowledge (which is an externality). Both stocks
of knowledge expand over time through investment in learning by incumbent
ﬁrms. Firms incur a ﬁxed cost of staying in the industry every period. At any
point of time, the stock of knowledge is ﬁxed and so the production technology
is subject to decreasing returns i.e., the marginal cost curve slopes upwards. As
the stock of ﬁrm level and industry level knowledge expands, the marginal cost
curve and the ﬁxed cost of staying in the industry shifts downwards (for ﬁrms
within the industry).
Firms maximize their discounted sum of net proﬁt.
We assume that the good produced is homogenous and non-durable. The




Zt =industry wide knowledge in period t.
xt(i)= increase in ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge (investment) by ﬁrm i in period t.
zt(i)= ﬁrm speciﬁck n o w l e d g es t o c ko fﬁrm i in period t.
qt(i)= output of ﬁrm i in period t.
τ(i)= entry period for ﬁrm i.
T(i)= exit period for ﬁrm i.
At = {i :: τ(i) ≤ t ≤ T(i)} = set of active ﬁrms in period t.
Qt =industry output in period t.
4P(Q):inverse market demand function, identical every period, strictly de-
creasing, smooth, P(Q) ↓ 0 as Q →∞ .
D(p): market demand function.
p:c h o k ep r i c e ,D(p)=0 .
pt :price in period t.
C(q,z,Z): Cost of producing q by a ﬁrm (which has entered and has not
exited the industry) when its ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge capital is z and when the
industry-wide knowledge capital is Z.
Assume: C(q,z,Z) is continuous on R3
+, continuously diﬀerentiable and
strictly convex in ( q,z) ∈ R2
+, strictly increasing in q, strictly decreasing in
z and Z; C(0,z,Z) > 0 (positive ﬁxed cost of staying in the industry). Further,
Cq(q,z,Z) is non-increasing in z and Z. There exists a continuous, strictly
increasing function m(q) such that for any q ≥ 0





The latter ensures that the output of and investment by ﬁrms are bounded
along any feasible path (thus ruling out dynamic increasing returns to scale).
For any z,Z, let the minimum average cost of production be denoted by
A(z,Z)=m i n {
C(q,z,Z)
q : q ≥ 0}.We assume that:
p =i n f{A(z,Z):z ≥ 0,Z≥ 0} > 0
Also denote:
p = A(0,0)
φ(x): cost of investment x in ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge capital in any period,
φ strictly increasing and strictly convex.
There is a measure M of ex ante identical ﬁrms - potential entrants - who
may enter and exit in any period. M is large enough but ﬁnite. With some
abuse of notation we shall also denote by M the set of all potential ﬁrms. We
can think of each potential as points in an interval with Lebesque measure.
A ﬁrm i w h i c he n t e r si np e r i o dτ(i) and exits in period T(i) (T(i) may be










5This captures the idea that spillover from ﬁrm speciﬁcl e a r n i n ga d dt oa c c u -
mulation of industry-wide knowledge which is publicly accessible.8 Every ﬁrm
i decides on its period of entry and exit τ(i),T(i). Not entering is equivalent to
setting τ(i)=∞.I ne a c hp e r i o dt = τ(i),...,T(i), an active ﬁrm i decides on
its output qt(i) and current investment xt(i) in ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge capital




t[ptqt(i) − C(qt(i),z t(i),Z t) − φ(xt(i))].
An industry equilibrium path is one where ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, every
entering ﬁrm earns zero intertemporal proﬁt, no ﬁrm can make strictly positive
proﬁt by any feasible action proﬁle and the market clears every period. Let ν
denote the extended set of positive natural numbers including the point +∞.
Deﬁnition 1 An Industry Equilibrium is given by a price sequence {pt}∞
t=0,a
sequence of industry wide knowledge {Zt}∞
t=0ap r o ﬁle of entry periods for all
potential ﬁrms (τ(i))i∈M, τ(i) ∈ ν, ap r o ﬁle of exit periods for all ﬁrms that
enter (T(i))i∈M,τ(i)<∞,T(i) ∈ ν, and a proﬁle of actions for all active ﬁrms
{qt(i), xt(i)}
T(i)
t=τ(i),q t(i) ≥ 0,x t(i) ≥ 0,i∈ M,τ(i) < ∞, such that:
(i) Zt = Zt−1 +
R
{i:τ(i)≤t−1≤T(i)} xt−1(i)di,Z0 =0








t[ptqt − C(qt,z t,Z t) − φ(xt)]









t[ptqt(i) − C(qt(i),z t(i),Z t) − φ(xt(i))] = 0
(iv) There does not exist any proﬁle of entry, exit, production and investment
decisions for a ﬁrm which can yield strictly positive intertemporal proﬁt: For
8An alternative formulation (industry wide by learning by doing - Marshallian externalities-
decreasing cost industry) :
Zτ = Zτ−1 +
]
{i:T(i)≤τ≤T(i)+k(i)}
qτ(i)di = Zτ−1 + Qt,Z 0 =0 ]





t[ptqt − C(qt,z t,Z t) − φ(xt)] (1)
subject to qt,x t ≥ 0 (2)
zτ =0 ,z t =
t−1 X
j=τ
xj,t= τ +1 ,..,T.






3E x i s t e n c e .
To be included later.
4 Characterization of Equilibrium Path.
For the time being assume that a competitive equilibrium exists.
Lemma 2 If exit occurs at the end of period t,t h e npt+1 ≤ pt.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that pt+1 >p t.If ﬁrm i exits at the end of
period t,t h e n
ptqt(i) − C(qt(i),z t(i),Z t) ≥ 0
for otherwise the ﬁrm would do strictly better by exiting at the end of period
t − 1 (or not entering, if t =0 ). This, in turn, implies that
pt+1qt(i) − C(qt(i),z t(i),Z t) > 0
and since Zt+1 ≥ Zt,
pt+1qt(i) − C(qt(i),z t(i),Z t+1) > 0
which means the ﬁrm can earn strictly positive proﬁtb ys t a y i n go nf o ro n em o r e
period with no additional investment. This violates the deﬁnition of equilibrium.
7Proposition 3 Every equilibrium price sequence {pt}is non-increasing over
time i.e., pt+1 ≤ pt for all t.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that pt+1 >p t.From the previous lemma,
w eh a v et h a tt h e r ei sn oe x i ta tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt. Then,
At ⊂ At+1
Observe that since Zt+1 ≥ Zt and zt+1(i) ≥ zt(i) for all i ∈ At,
Cq(q,,zt(i),Z t) ≥ Cq(q,,zt+1(i),Z t+1) for all q ≥ 0
so that
pt ≤ Cq(qt(i),,z t(i),Z t) and pt+1 = Cq(qt+1(i),,z t+1(i),Z t+1)
implies
qt+1(i) >q t(i) for all i ∈ At such that qt+1(i) > 0
Further,












which means that for the market to clear we must have
pt >p t+1
a contradiction.
Note that the equilibrium prices are bounded below by p,the lowest possible
minimum average cost over all possible levels of learning. For if pt <pfor
some t,t h e npτ <pfor all τ ≥ t which makes ALL active ﬁrms earn losses
every period after t, not compatible with the deﬁnition of equilibrium. Also,
the prices are bounded above by p.,It can be shown that, in fact:
Proposition 4 p0 ≤ p,pt < p for all t ≥ 1.
Proof. If pt > p a ﬁrm could enter for only one period and make strictly
positive proﬁt. If pt = p for some t ≥ 1, then since prices are non-increasing over
time, pk = p,k =0 ,..t. In that case, a ﬁrm can enter in period 0,m a k ea ni n ﬁni-
tesimal but strictly positive investment and make strictly positive intertemporal
proﬁtb ye x i t i n gi np e r i o dt.




t[ptqt − C(qt,z t,Z t) − φ(xt)] ≥ 0
8Proof. Trivial. Else, ﬁrm is better oﬀ exiting the market earlier than period
b t.
Proposition 6 Let (b zt ,b zt+1) and (e zt,e zt+1) be the levels of ﬁrm speciﬁck n o w l -
edge for two ﬁrms that are active in the market in both periods t and t +1 .
Then, b zt < e zt ⇒ b zt+1 < e zt+1.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that b zt+1 ≥ e zt+1.Then
b zt+1 ≥ e zt+1 ≥ e zt > b zt
For a ﬁrm that is active in the market at the beginning of period t+1with ﬁrm-
speciﬁc knowledge stock equal to z,l e tVt+1(z) denote the (maximum) present
value of intertemporal proﬁts from period t+1onwards (net of investment made
in such periods). Let πt(zt) denote the maximum proﬁti np e r i o dt (gross of
investment cost incurred in period t)f o raﬁrm whose current knowledge stock
is zt.Then,
b zt+1 ∈ argmax{πt(b zt) − φ(z − b zt)+δVt+1(z):z ≥ b zt}
e zt+1 ∈ argmax{πt(e zt) − φ(z − e zt)+δVt+1(z):z ≥ e zt
Therefore:
πt(b zt) − φ(b zt+1 − b zt)+δVt+1(b zt+1) ≥ πt(b zt) − φ(e zt+1 − b zt)+δVt+1(e zt+1)
πt(e zt) − φ(e zt+1 − e zt)+δVt+1(e zt+1) ≥ πt(e zt) − φ(b zt+1 − e zt)+δVt+1(b zt+1)
so that
−φ(b zt+1 − b zt)+δVt+1(b zt+1) ≥− φ(e zt+1 − b zt)+δVt+1(e zt+1)
−φ(e zt+1 − e zt)+δVt+1(e zt+1) ≥− φ(b zt+1 − e zt)+δVt+1(b zt+1)
First, consider the case where b zt+1 > e zt+1.From the above inequalities,
we have
φ(b zt+1−b zt)−φ(e zt+1−b zt) ≤ δ[Vt+1(b zt+1)−Vt+1(e zt+1)] ≤ φ(b zt+1−e zt)−φ(e zt+1−e zt)
which violates strict convexity of φ as e zt > b zt .Next, consider the case where
b zt+1 = e zt+1. Let i denote the ﬁrm whose knowledge stock in period t is e zt and
let j denote the ﬁrm whose knowledge stock in period t is b zt.As Vt+1(e zt+1)=
Vt+1(b zt+1), the maximum discounted sum of proﬁt sn e to fi n v e s t m e n tc o s tb e -
tween periods t +1and T(i) for ﬁrm i must be exactly equal to the maximum
discounted sum of proﬁts net of investment cost between periods t+1and T(j)
for ﬁrm j. This would mean that from period t +1onwards, the output and
investment path of ﬁrm j (and ﬁrm j0s exit period) is also optimal for ﬁrm i.
The ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm j with respect to its investment in period t
implies (note b zt+1 − b zt > 0)
9φ





and since e zt+1 − e zt < b zt+1 − b zt
φ





which implies that if ﬁrm i invests an amount slightly higher than e zt+1 − e zt in
period t and thereafter replicates the action proﬁle of ﬁrm j, its net intertem-
poral proﬁt will be higher than its initial optimal path, a contradiction. //
5 Delayed Entry
Main argument: Some ﬁrms choose to enter later in order to take advantage of
industry wide increase in knowledge capital over time even though equilibrium
prices are falling. In particular, in an equilibrium with delayed entry, equilibrium
prices are such that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between entering in period 0 and in a
later period.
In order to illustrate the possibility of delayed entry, we ﬁrst consider the
situation where the marginal cost curve is independent of investment in learning
as well as industry-wide externalities i.e., the cost function is of the form:
C(q,z,Z)=f(z,Z)+g(q)
where f(z,Z) represents the ﬁxed cost (of being active in the industry) while
g(q) represents the variable cost. Assume that g0(q) > 0,g”(q) > 0.Further,
fZ(0,0) < 0 and 1+δfz(0,Z) < 0 for all Z>0. (This can be relaxed).
Proposition 7 A positive measure of ﬁrms necessarily enter after period 0.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, At+1 ⊂ At for all t.W eﬁrst claim it must be
t h ec a s et h a tpt = pt+1 for all t. To see this, note that the equilibrium price
sequence is non-increasing and if pt >p t+1 for some t,then qt(i) >q t+1(i) for











which means that for the market to clear we must have
pt <p t+1
10a contradiction. So, the equilibrium prices are constant over time, equal to p∗,
say. Every ﬁrm produces q∗ every period where
g0(q∗)=p∗
This also implies that for the market to clear, At+1 = At a.e. for all t (no
exit).Now, since 1+δfz(0,Z) < 0, x0(i) > 0 for all i ∈ A0. This implies that




t[p∗q∗ − g(q∗) − f(zt(i),Z t) − φ(xt(i))] = 0 for all active i




t[p∗q∗ − g(q∗) − f(zt(i), b Zt) − φ(xt(i))] > 0 where b Zt = Zt+1
The above expression also gives the intertemporal net proﬁte a r n e db yaﬁrm j
that enters in period 1 and sets qt(j)=q∗,x t(j)=xt−1(i) for all t ≥ 1. This
violates the deﬁnition of equilibrium. The proof is complete.
The next step is to extend the possibility of delayed to a more general situ-
ation where both marginal cost & ﬁxed cost can fall over time with increase in
learning and externalities.
Recall that the equilibrium prices are bounded above by p.D e ﬁne an upper
bound q on the quantity produced by any ﬁrm in any period by:
m(q)=p
Then, for any ﬁrm entering the industry, an upper bound on its present value
of production cost is given by:
C(q,0,0)
1 − δ




Then, x is an upper bound on xt and zt It might be possible to ﬁnd a much
tighter upper bound and work with that instead.
The next proposition shows that if the MC curves decline at a much smaller
rate than the average cost (i.e., the ﬁxed cost), then delayed entry occurs.
11Proposition 8 Suppose that for any b q ∈ [0,q],b z ∈ [0,x],Z≥ 0 and h>0
max
0≤q≤q,0≤z≤x





C(b q,z,Z + h)
b q
]
then delayed entry must occur on the equilibrium path.
Proof. Consider an industry equilibrium and suppose that late entry does
not occur. Let {pt,Z t}∞
t=o be the associated sequence of prices and industry-
wide knowledge on the equilibrium path. Note that in any such equilibrium,
there must exist a strictly positive measure of active ﬁrms i such that T(i)=∞.
This is because the total industry output along the equilibrium path is bounded
below by D(p) while the output of any individual ﬁrm in any period is bounded
above by q>0. Choose any ﬁrm i such that T(i)=∞. Let the optimal sequence
of actions (output and investment) chosen by this ﬁrm be given by {qt,x t}∞
t=0
and let {zt}∞




t[ptqt − C(qt,z t,Z t) − φ(xt)] = 0
Now. consider a ﬁrm which enters in period 1, never exits and chooses actions
e qt = qt−1,e xt = xt−1 (with ﬁrm speciﬁck n o w l e d g ee zt = zt−1),t=1 ,...,∞. The









t−1[(pt − pt−1 + pt−1)qt−1











t−1((pt − pt−1)qt−1 − (C(qt−1,z t−1,Z t) − C(qt−1,z t−1,Z t−1))}]




















t[{C(qt,z t,Z t) − C(qt,z t,Z t+1)} − qt(pt − pt+1)]
We shall show that the last expression is strictly positive by showing that for
t =0 ,1,....∞
{C(qt,z t,Z t) − C(qt,z t,Z t+1)} − qt(pt − pt+1) > 0
To see this let
α =m a x
0≤q≤q,0≤z≤x
[Cq(q,z,Zt) − Cq(q,z + x,Zt+1)]
Under the condition outlined in the proposition:
C(qt,z t,Z t) − C(qt,z t,Z t+1)
qt
>α
It is suﬃcient to show that
pt − pt+1 ≤ α
Suppose to the contrary that pt −pt+1 >α . Then, for any ﬁrm i which is active
in both periods t and t +1 ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tqt(i) >q t+1(i).F o r i f
qt(i) ≤ qt+1(i)
pt+1 = Cq(qt+1(i),z t+1(i),Z t+1)
≥ Cq(qt(i),z t+1(i),Z t+1)
≥ Cq(qt(i),z t(i)+x,Zt+1)
≥ Cq(qt(i),z t(i),Z t) − α = pt − α
a contradiction. But if qt(i) >q t+1(i) for all ﬁrms active in periods t and t +1
and no new entry occurs in period t +1 , then the total industry output in
period t is greater than that in period t +1which violates the market clearing
condition since pt − pt+1 >αimplies pt >p t+1. Thus, it must be the case that
pt − pt+1 ≤ α. The proof is complete.
136S h a k e - o u t .
What are the conditions under which some ﬁrms exit the industry over time on
the equilibrium path?
Main argument: If the marginal cost curve declines (ﬁrms’ supply curve
expands) sharply with increase in knowledge, then in the absence of shake-out,
the industry prices would have to fall drastically. But if the prices fall too
sharply, ﬁrms cannot recover their investment through future proﬁts - prices
faced by mature ﬁrms need to be more than their minimum average cost and
their optimal output in later periods exceeds their minimum eﬃcient scale.
Another way to see it is that the market is "restricted eﬃcient" in the sense
that taking as given any equilibrium path of industry wide knowledge {Zt},t h e
industry path of output, investment, entry and exit maximizes the discounted
sum of social surplus; such a "restricted" social planner would want a lot of
ﬁrms around initially (steep MC curve initially ) in order to reduce industry
production cost but would want only some of them to grow "big" and produce at
low MC - while dispensing with the rest (saving on the ﬁxed cost). Recall. that
for any z,Z, the minimum average cost of production is denoted by A(z,Z)=
min{
C(q,z,Z)
q : q ≥ 0} and that p = A(0.0).Let qm(z,Z) be the output at which
average cost of production is minimized when knowledge levels are (z,Z)
Cq(qm(z,Z),z,Z)=A(z,Z)






then there exists a positive measure of ﬁrms who exit in ﬁnite time.
Proof. Suppose that no (positive measure of) exit occurs along the equi-
librium path. Then the set of active ﬁrms in every period includes A0 and the
measure of active ﬁr m si sa tl e a s ta sl a r g ea sn0.
Since {pt} is a bounded decreasing sequence, it converges to, say, b p. Note
that {zt(i)} and {Zt} are bounded sequences along any equilibrium path (to see
the latter observe that the total discounted sum of industry cost of production
using cost function C(q,0,0) and assuming output is equal to D(p) every period
is bounded; the total investment of all ﬁrms cannot exceed that). For i ∈ A0,let
b z(i)=l i m t→∞ zt(i) and let b z =i n f i∈A0 b z(i).F u r t h e r ,l e tb Z =l i m t→∞ Zt.Then,
it must be true that
b p ≥ A(b z, b Z)
T os e et h i sn o t et h a ti fb p<A (b z, b Z), there exists a positive measure of ﬁrms
i ∈ A0 and time periods t0(i),s u c ht h a tt ≥ t0(i) implies pt <A (zt(i),Z t)
which implies that such ﬁrms are better oﬀ exiting before time t0(i) and the
latter contradicts the hypothesis that zero measure of exit occurs along the
14equilibrium path. For i ∈ A0,let b q(i) = limt→∞ qt(i) and let b q =i n f i∈A0 b q(i).I t
must be true that
b q ≥ qm(b z, b Z)
for otherwise, there would be a positive measure of ﬁrms i ∈ A0 and time periods
t0(i), such that t ≥ t0(i) implies qt(i) <q m(zt(i),Z t) which wouldn’t be optimal
unless pt <A (zt(i),Z t), a contradiction. Choose any  >0. Then, there exists







b q −  
so that taking limit as t →∞
n0 ≤
D(b p)
b q −  




and using the fact that b p ≥ A(b z, b Z) and b q ≥ qm(b z, b Z) we have
n0 ≤
D(A(b z, b Z)
qm(b z, b Z)










a contradiction. The proof is complete.//
7 Firms that exit are younger.
In this section, we show that later entrants exit earlier. This implies that, at
the point of exit, the age of ﬁrms that exit is lower than that of other incumbent
ﬁrms.It will be generalized later.
Proposition 10 If ﬁrm i exits in period t, then for every ﬁrm j that is active
in the market in period t and does not exit that period, τ(j) ≤ τ(i).
15Proof. Since T(j) >T(i),i tm u s tb et r u et h a tzt(i) ≤ zt(j) - for otherwise,
ﬁrm i can earn strictly positive net intertemporal proﬁt by producing in the
market till period T(j) which contradicts the deﬁnition of equilibrium. Now,
suppose τ(j) >τ (i). In period τ(j),ﬁrm j0s stock of ﬁrm speciﬁck n o w l e d g e
zτ(j)(j)=0 , while ﬁrm i’s stock of knowledge zτ(j)(i) > 0. Using Proposition
(?), we can see that this implies that zt(i) >z t(j),a contradiction.
8 Firms that exit are smaller.
Proposition 11 If T(i) < ∞, then for any ﬁrm j ∈ AT(i) such that T(j) >
T(i),z T(i)(j) ≥ zT((i)(i) and qT(i)(j) ≥ qT((i)(i) In other words, at its point of
exit a ﬁrm’s stock of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge (its accumulated investment) and
its output are no larger than that of any incumbent ﬁrm which does not exit in
that period.
Proof. Since the MC curve (ﬁrm’s supply curve) is non-increasing in z,
it is suﬃcient to show that zT(i)(j) ≥ zT((i)(i).Suppose to the contrary that




t[(ptqt(j) − C(qt(j),z t(j),Z t) − φ(xt(j))] ≥ 0
On the other hand ﬁrm i earns zero discounted sum of net proﬁta ti t sp o i n to f
exit and so if it stays on till period T(j) >T(i) and replicates the investment
and output path of ﬁrm j in periods t = T(i)+1 ,..,T(j) then it can earn
strictly positive intertemporal net proﬁt (as its existing stock of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge in period T(i) is higher than that of j and will be higher in every
period thereafter). This is a contradiction. //
9 Long Run Behavior of the Industry.
Our ﬁrst result in this section shows that as observed empirically, both entry
and exit decline to negligible levels in the long run and the industry "stabilizes".
Note that as {pt} is non-increasing and bounded below by p > 0, it converges
to some p∗ > 0. Similarly, {Zt} is an non-decreasing bounded sequence and
converges to some ﬁinite Z∗ > 0.
Proposition 12 The measure of ﬁrms that enter the industry as well as mea-
sure of ﬁrms that exit the industry in period t converge to zero as t −→ ∞.
16Proof. Choose any small  >0.There exists T( ), such that for all t ≥ T( ),
pt ∈ [p∗,p ∗ +  ], Zt ∈ [Z∗ −  ,Z∗], the industry output Qt ∈ [D(p∗ +  ),D(p∗)]
and
Qt+1 − Qt ≤ [D(p∗) − D(p∗ +  )]
. For any period t ≥ T( ) in which a measure mt > 0 of ﬁrms enter, each entrant
ﬁrm produces at least an amount e q>0 where Cq(e q,0,0) = p∗ and since both
entry and exit cannot occur in the same period (argued earlier) , it must be the
case that
Qt+1 − Qt ≥ mte q
so that
mt ≤
[D(p∗) − D(p∗ +  )]
e q
−→ 0 as   −→ 0.
Therefore, the measure of entering ﬁrms converges to zero as t −→ ∞. Next, we
show that the measure of exiting ﬁr m sm u s ta l s oc o n v e r g et oz e r oa st −→ ∞.
Suppose not. Then there exists ζ>0 and a subsequence of time periods {t0}
along which the measure of exiting ﬁr m si sa tl e a s ta sl a r g ea sζ. Once again,
note that entry and exit cannot occur simultaneously. Therefore, if a measure
mt0 ≥ ζof ﬁrms exit occurs at the beginning of period t0,then this by itself would
lead to a decline in industry output (over the previous period) by an amount of
at least qζ = h(say) > 0 where q is a uniform lower bound on ﬁrm level output
deﬁned by Cq(q,0,0) = p. However, since prices are non-increasing, industry
output must be non-decreasing over time. Thus, active ﬁrms in period t0that
do not exit the market must be expanding their total output over the previous
period by at least h.Let b St0 denote the set of active ﬁrms in period t0 − 1 that




[qt0(i) − qt0−1(i)]di ≥ h
For any z ∈ [0,z],Z ∈ [0,Z],p∈ [p,p] let an individual ﬁrm’s supply function
qS(p;z,Z) be implicitly deﬁned by:
Cq(qS(p;z,Z),z,Z)=p




dZ are strictly positive and bounded on the domain
[p,p] × [0,z] × [0,Z];l e tα1 and α2 be the upper bounds on this domain. Note
that n =
D(p)
q is an upper bound on the measure of active ﬁrms in any period.




















[α1xt0−1(i)]di + α2(Zt0 − Zt0−1)]b nt0
= α1(Zt0 − Zt0−1)+α2(Zt0 − Zt0−1)]b nt0
≤ (α1 + nα2)(Zt0 − Zt0−1),
−→ 0 as t0 −→ ∞,s i n c e{Zt} is convergent.
This leads to a contradiction. //
Let S∗ = {i : τ(i) < ∞,T(i)=∞} be the set of ﬁrms that produce in the
long run.
For i ∈ S∗, let z∗(i) = limt→∞ zt(i).
Questions:
1. Possibility of persistence of positive proﬁts in the long run: p∗ >A (z∗(i),Z∗)
for all i ∈ subset of S∗ of strictly positive measure?




S∗ z∗(j)dj for all i ∈ subset of S∗ of strictly positive measure?
Other questions:
1. Condition for no shakeout
2. Condition for no late entry
3. Characterization of ﬁrst best path - is late entry possible on ﬁrst best
path?
4. How does equilibrium path diﬀer from ﬁrst best?
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